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Introduction
Large excess death numbers draw big attention. Examples 
include the high profile estimates of excess deaths for the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (International Rescue 
Committee, 2007) and Darfur (Hagan and Palloni, 2006; 
Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010).1 Such numbers are 
widely considered scientifically sound, of great interest to 
the general public and worthy of publication in top peer-
reviewed journals, although they often generate contro-
versy in both academic journals and the media (NBC News, 
2008; Spagat et al., 2009; ScienceInsider, 2010).
The estimate of 500,000 excess deaths in the Iraq war, 
2003–2011, by Hagopian et al. (2013) was a media event 
complete with a press release (University of Washington, 
2013). In the present paper we reexamine the Hagopian 
et al. (2013) dramatic claim using exactly the same dataset 
as Hagopian et al. (2013) do, the University Collaborative 
Iraq Mortality Study (UCIMS). We find that the UCIMS 
data do not support the 500,000 claim. Most importantly, the 
estimate unravels as soon as we distinguish between violent 
deaths and non-violent deaths. Estimates for non-violent 
excess deaths have extremely wide uncertainty intervals that 
stretch well below zero. Moreover, we employ a differences-
in-differences (DiD) design that finds no local spillovers 
running from war violence to elevated non-violent death 
rates, reinforcing our null finding for non-violent excess 
deaths.2 Three further corrections and improvements to the 
original analysis undermine the half-a-million claim even 
more. These are accounting for; i) stratification in the 
UCIMS sampling design; ii) weak death certificate backing 
for some deaths; and iii) the feeble basis for nearly 100,000 
deaths which enter the estimate through rounding and con-
fusion between deaths and excess deaths.3
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Our approach can serve as a model for future studies of 
excess war deaths. In particular, we recommend that future 
researchers make excess death estimates for non-violent 
deaths alone rather than following the established practice 
of conflating violent deaths with non-violent deaths in 
excess death estimates. We also advocate the use of DiD 
strategies to test whether war violence causes increases in 
non-violent death rates in areas where war violence is 
prevalent.
Our analytical improvements
The UCIMS survey of deaths in the Iraq war is the most 
recent high-profile estimate of excess deaths in war. The 
data come from a nationally representative survey con-
ducted in mid 2013 of individuals in 2,000 randomly 
selected households situated in 100 clusters across Iraq. 
The fieldwork for this study appears to be good and the data 
are freely available to a reasonable level of detail.4 We are 
able to replicate the Hagopian et al. (2013) results almost 
exactly once we accept all their assumptions. So we turn 
now to several corrections and improvements to the origi-
nal analysis.
Measuring excess war mortality
War can cause both violent deaths, or direct battle deaths from 
the conflict, as well as non-violent deaths, arising indirectly 
from the consequences of the conflict. Yet violent deaths are 
easier to attribute to war than are non-violent deaths that can, 
at best, be only indirectly linked to war. Examples of non-
violent war deaths can include hospital patients who die after 
not receiving crucial medical treatments due to war-caused 
power outages in hospitals or people who die of cholera after 
war-related damage to water treatment facilities. The number 
of non-violent deaths indirectly attributable to war might be 
substantial in some modern conflicts, although it is difficult to 
pin down these effects analytically.
The primary challenge for estimates of the number of 
non-violent deaths caused indirectly by a war is to avoid 
including non-violent deaths that would have occurred 
even without war. The main strategy used in the literature to 
tackle this separation problem is to define a counterfactual 
death rate that, one argues, would have occurred if war had 
been avoided. This counterfactual death rate, sometimes 
known as a baseline death rate, is subtracted from the death 
rate that actually occurs during the war. The difference 
between the actual death rate and the baseline death rate is 
commonly designated as an excess death rate. This excess 
death rate is then multiplied by the size of the at risk popu-
lation to obtain a number of excess deaths.5
Hagopian et al. (2013) follow most literature in using 
the pre-war death rate as their baseline (Checchi and 
Roberts, 2005). The key assumption underpinning this 
choice is that the pre-war death rate would have carried 
forward in time unaltered if war had never broken out. If 
this assumption is approximately true then it is reasonable 
to view the during-war death rate minus the baseline death 
rate as a war-caused excess death rate.
We stress that researchers generally conflate violent 
deaths with non-violent deaths when they make excess 
death calculations. Yet this conflation of two very different 
death types is fundamentally inconsistent with the whole 
point of invoking the excess deaths concept in the first 
place: to capture the possibility that war violence can lead 
indirectly to non-violent deaths. Mixing violent deaths into 
an excess death estimate confounds the channel running 
from violence to non-violent death with a distinct, and triv-
ial, channel running from violence to violent deaths. Thus, 
a standard excess death estimate can create an illusion that 
a war is indirectly causing nonviolent deaths even for a war 
that causes exclusively violent deaths. Analogously, one 
might state that the average vegetarian consumes approxi-
mately one ton of vegetables plus meat per year. While 
technically correct this statement could create a false 
impression that the average vegetarian hypocritically con-
sumes meat when, in fact, the ton of vegetables plus meat 
breaks down into one ton of vegetables and 0 tons of meat. 
Therefore, we argue that the best practice for evaluating the 
human cost of war should proceed along two tracks. First 
estimate direct violent deaths and then estimate excess non-
violent deaths. Despite this advice, we maintain consist-
ency with the existing literature by also estimating excess 
deaths in the standard manner that conflates violent deaths 
with non-violent ones.
Non-violent deaths versus violent deaths
The excess deaths concept asserts that war violence leads 
indirectly to non-violent deaths. If so, then we should be 
able to link war violence with elevated non-violent death 
rates. We attempt to make this connection with a difference-
in-difference (DiD) estimator (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), 
the mechanics of which we will explain in detail in section 
(Trying to link violence with non-violent death rates). Here 
we just provide some basic intuitions.
Our DiD estimator tests whether relatively large 
increases in non-violent deaths in particular locations are 
associated with relatively high violence levels in these 
locations. This approach detects spillovers from violence 
to non-violent deaths as long as these spillovers operate at 
a local level. If, for example, local bomb attacks cause 
substantial numbers of non-violent deaths by disrupting 
local water purification or hospital services, then the DiD 
estimator should detect these indirect effects of violence. 
On the other hand, the DiD approach will not detect indi-
rect channels running from violence to non-violent deaths 
if these effects are diffused across space. A DiD estimator 
would not be useful for analysing the effects of violence 
that decreases national tax revenues, leading to national 
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budget cuts to health care that increase national death 
rates. Moreover, national or international policy may 
direct aid programme to violence-plagued local areas, off-
setting real local spillovers in full or in part. Accounting 
for such contrary forces would be tricky. Aid would pre-
vent excess deaths that would appear if aid were stopped 
and if would be difficult or impossible to measure these 
countervailing forces. Despite these caveats, many plausi-
ble spillovers will tend to operate at the local level and, 
therefore, the DiD estimator is a valuable tool for expos-
ing such effects.
Stratification
The UCIMS is a cluster survey stratified by governorate. 
Hagopian et al. (2013) account for clustering in their 
uncertainty intervals but, incorrectly, ignore the impact of 
stratification on both their central estimates and uncer-
tainty intervals. This is a mistake because stratification can 
have big effects on both of these calculations (Working 
Group for Mortality Estimation in Emergencies, 2007; 
Lohr, 2009). Table 1 displays the UCIMS stratification 
scheme by governorate. Households in governorates with 
relative weights below 1 have inclusion probabilities 
higher than what they would have had under an equal 
probabilities scheme and vice versa. For example, a death 
in Anbar is 5.5 times more likely to appear in the sample 
than is a death in Thi-Qar (
2.75
0.50
= 5.5 ). Therefore, in-
sample deaths in Thi-Qar should represent 5.5 times more 
estimated deaths than in-sample deaths in Anbar do.6
A second stratification issue is that the procedures for esti-
mating uncertainty intervals should incorporate the complexi-
ties of the sampling scheme, such as departures from equal 
inclusion probabilities. Hagopian et al. (2013) bootstrap 
(Shalizi, 2010) their uncertainty intervals but, incorrectly, 
ignore stratification in their computations. For example, the 
UCIMS sample contains 23 Baghdad clusters so each boot-
strap resample should also contain 23 Baghdad clusters, each 
drawn with replacement from the 23 original Baghdad clus-
ters. The Hagopian et al. (2013) resampling does not satisfy 
this requirement but we fix this problem in our bootstraps.
Note that all of the uncertainly intervals (UIs) in both our 
paper and in the original Hagopian et al. (2013) paper are 
obtained through bootstrapping, although the dataset has only 
100 clusters which is not enough to be sanguine about using 
asymptotic theory (Flynn and Peters, 2004; Pons, 2007). 
Thus, the reader should regard all UIs in the paper as too nar-
row, a point which makes the Hagopian et al. (2013) claim of 
500,000 excess deaths even less credible than the uncertainty 
intervals we publish in this paper suggest.
Death certificates
The UCIMS dataset provides the outcome of each interviewer 
attempt to verify an in-sample death with a matching death 
certificate. There are 385 reported deaths in the dataset, of 
which interviewers record seeing death certificates for 284. 
However, 32 times respondents state that they do not possess a 
death certificate to document a reported death. In a further 66 
cases, a respondent reports a death, claims to have a death cer-
tificate confirming the death, but fails to produce the supposed 
death certificate when prompted to do so in the interview.7 We 
find this last type of reported death to be rather dubious; why 
would someone claim to have a death certificate he/she does 
not actually have? Nevertheless, many, perhaps even most, 
cases of reported deaths not backed by death certificates are 
real. People can lose or misplace a death certificate and in 
some cases, particularly during the first phase of the war, death 
certificates were never issued. Thus, it is difficult to quantify 
the uncertainty surrounding deaths not fully backed by death 
certificates although it is suboptimal to simply ignore this 
issue as Hagopian et al. (2013) do in their analysis. We address 
death certificate uncertainty by presenting four separate sets of 
estimates. These either i) accept all reported deaths, as in the 
original paper; ii) reject all reported deaths without a shown 
death certificate; iii) reject reported deaths for which respond-
ents admit to not possessing a death certificate; or iv) reject 
reported deaths for which respondents say they have a death 
certificate but fail to produce one.
From 400,000 to 500,000
There is a confusing conflict between the Hagopian et al. 
(2013) UCIMS-based central estimate of 406,000 excess 
deaths and the claim in the Hagopian et al. (2013) paper that 
Table 1. Relative weights by governorate.
Governorate Weight
Thi Qar 2.75
Kirkuk 2.18
Najaf 2.02
Babylon 1.62
Muthanna 1.59
Kerbela 1.52
Salah Al Deen 1.42
Duhouk 1.25
Wasit 1.23
Maysan 0.98
Diala 0.98
Baghdad 0.94
Basra 0.90
Sulaimaniya 0.89
Ninevah 0.86
Erbil 0.63
Qadisiyya 0.61
Anbar 0.50
Each governorate’s weight is its share of total population divided by its 
share of respondents in the survey.
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they estimate 500,000 deaths.8 The authors reach beyond 
their data to bridge the gap of nearly 100,000 deaths. 
Specifically, they argue that there is a war refugee popula-
tion of approximately two million people not covered by 
their survey from which there were, they say, approximately 
56,000 deaths. They then add 56,000 to 406,000 and round 
up to 500,000. There are two good reasons to reject this 
manoeuvre. First, 56,000 deaths in a refugee population of 2 
million is barely above the baseline rate of 2.89 per 1,000 
per year that Hagopian et al. (2013) use in their excess death 
estimates.  Therefore, it is not clear that adding in refugees 
should increase the excess death estimate at all. Therefore, if 
anything, adding in refugees should decrease rather than 
increase the excess death estimate. Second, there can be no 
good basis to round from 462,000 all the way up to 500,000.
In search of excess deaths
Excess deaths estimates
Figure 1 presents a range of excess death calculations. In panel 
(a), we focus only on non-violent deaths whereas in panel (b), 
we revert to the standard approach of conflating violent deaths 
with non-violent deaths. Our primary and preferred estimates 
are the ones in panel (a) since, as argued in section (Measuring 
Excess War Mortality), the concept of excess deaths is funda-
mentally about war violence causing non-violent deaths, not 
about war violence causing violent deaths. We account for 
stratification and clustering in all of these results.
The top estimate in panel (a) shows that we cannot reject 
a hypothesis of negative non-violent excess deaths at a 10% 
level, even if we accept every reported death in the survey 
regardless of the quality of its death certificate backing. Of 
course, discounting reported deaths without death certifi-
cates drags the estimates further downwards. The central 
estimates for non-violent excess deaths in panel (a) are all 
well below 200,000 and the bottoms of these uncertainty 
intervals all drop below − 300,000. Thus, the evidence in 
favor of even a positive number of non-violent excess 
deaths is exceedingly thin.
The estimates in panel (b) show that the UCIMS data 
do not support the Hagopian et al. (2013) claim of 
500,000 excess deaths even when we follow Hagopian 
et al. (2013) in conflating violent deaths with non-violent 
ones in our excess deaths estimates. Although the stratifi-
cation adjustment barely moves the central estimates, it 
does widen the uncertainty interval substantially, even 
pulling the bottom of the uncertainty interval below zero 
for the top estimate in the panel that accepts all deaths 
regardless of death certificate backing. With this estimate 
we can still reject a hypothesis of negative excess deaths 
at around a 5% level, but a hypothesis of 500,000 or more 
excess deaths, well above the central estimate, is roundly 
rejected. The other estimates include only deaths with 
various degrees of death certificate backing, lowering all 
the central estimates considerably. We estimate 210,000 
excess deaths with the uncertainty interval swinging by 
more than 300,000 deaths in either direction when we 
Figure 1. Excess Deaths Estimates and Uncertainty Intervals. 
Central estimates and uncertainty intervals for excess deaths for non-violent deaths only in panel (a) and mixing together both violent and non-vio-
lent deaths in panel (b) The black squares and circles are central estimates. The grey bars give our 95% uncertainty intervals, each constructed from 
1,000 bootstrap replications. The black lines give the uncertainty interval from the original study (48,000–751,000). All these calculations account for 
stratification by governorate. The numbers underlying this picture are in appendix Table A2.
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insist on death certificate backing for all deaths. This 
estimate is at an extreme, as noted in section 1, but the 
top estimate is also at an extreme although, perhaps, 
closer to the truth.
Trying to link violence with non-violent death 
rates
The simplest DiD framework makes two binary divisions 
of the country along two separate dimensions: time and 
space. These divisions give us four groupings: a pre-war 
period and a during-war period crossed with a violent zone 
and a non-violent zone. The goal is to test whether living in 
the violent zone during the war is associated with relatively 
high non-violent death rates. We operationalise this idea 
with equation 1 in which h  indexes households, v  indexes 
zones (violent or non-violent), and t  gives the time period 
(pre-war or during-war). We define the violent zones to be 
Anbar, Baghdad and Diala. Such a binary division is, of 
course, arbitrary although our violent governorates are all 
more than 28% more violent than Kirkuk, the next most 
violent governorate. Moreover, moving Kirkuk into the 
violent category does not change our results qualitatively.
yhvt  is the count of non-violent deaths in household 
located in zone v  during period t . Similarly, hvt  is a ran-
dom shock to household h  located in zone v  during period 
t . There are three dummy variables, Dt , Dv  and Dvt  
which are equal to 1 , respectively, for households in the 
during-war period, for households in the violent zone and 
for households simultaneously in the the violent zone in the 
during-war period.9
y D D Dhvt t v vt hvt= γ λ β+ + +   (1)
The estimated parameters are γ , λ  and β . γ  will be posi-
tive if there is a general tendency applying across both 
zones for households to suffer more non-violent deaths in 
the during-war period than they do in the the pre-war 
period. λ  will be positive if, across both time periods, 
households tend to suffer more non-violent deaths in the 
violent zone than they do in the non-violent zone. The β  
coefficient is the key to the DiD approach. It gives the dif-
ference between the average difference in non-violent 
deaths, during-war minus pre-war, in the violent zone and 
the corresponding difference, during-war minus pre-war, in 
the non-violent zone. In other words, β  gives the cross 
effect on non-violent deaths from being in the violent zone 
during the war after controlling for the effect of being in the 
violent zone and the effect of being in the during-war 
period. The estimates from this simple model offer no evi-
dence that the key β  coefficient might be positive (see 
appendix for Table A3).10
Our main DiD estimates use a generalization of the above 
framework that does not force locations into the binary cat-
egories of either violent or non-violent (equation 2).
y t ViolenceLevel
t ViolenceLevel
ht h
ht ht
=
( * )
1 2
3
β β
β
+
+ + 
 (2)
Table 2 gives the results from these regressions. Violence is 
measured as the number of fatalities per 100 inhabitants in 
the governorate containing household h  (Violence Level gov ) 
except in column 6 where violence is measured at the cluster 
level (Violence Level cluster ). In one model we use a spatial 
lag of violence (column 5, Violence Level neighbours ) to account 
for cross-governorate violence spillovers. To facilitate easy 
comparisons between the models, we place all variables on a 
common scale by subtracting the mean and dividing by two 
times the standard deviation (Gelman, 2008).
The variable of interest is the product of the time period 
(Period), coded 1 for the war period and 0 for the pre-war 
period, and the violence level. This estimated coefficient 
gives the relationship between local violence and local non-
violent death counts during the war period, i.e. after control-
ling for the effect of living, both before and during the war, 
in a governorate (or cluster) that turns out to be violent dur-
ing the war. These key estimates (Period*Violence Level gov ) 
are all 0, rounded to the first significant decimal point, or 
negative in the first five specifications. Specification 6 pro-
vides, at best, a tiny scrap of evidence for a positive impact 
of violence on non-violent deaths; but even in this specifica-
tion we cannot reject a hypothesis of a 0 or negative effect at 
a standard significance level ( p -value of 0.18). These results 
are consistent with our earlier null findings both for non-
violent excess deaths and in the binary DiD.
Comparisons of Counterfactuals
We have searched for possible indirect effects of violence on 
non-violent death rates using two different methods, based 
on two different counterfactual analyses. We now briefly 
consider the difference between the two counterfactuals.
The key assumption in the excess deaths counterfactual 
is that the pre-war death rate would have carried forward in 
time if war had never broken out, i.e. the pre-war mortality 
rate is what the during-war mortality rate would have been 
without the war. If this assumption is approximately true 
then it is reasonable to view the actual death rates minus the 
baseline death rate as excess deaths caused by war. A prob-
lem with this counterfactual is that there can be important 
changes that affect mortality rates that are separate from 
and unconnected with war onset but that, nevertheless, hap-
pen at roughly the same time as onset does. Moreover, the 
Human Security Report (HSR) made an important critique 
of the excess deaths concept while accepting its main prem-
ise of extrapolating pre-war death rates forward in time to 
create a baseline (Human Security Report Project, 2011). 
HSR argued that death rates tend to decrease over time so it 
recommended projecting forward a decreasing death-rate 
trend rather than a flat line frozen at a pre-war rate. Thus, 
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HSR would interpret deviations from pre-war trends, rather 
than deviations from pre-war levels, as evidence for excess 
deaths. The HSR modification is a step forward in princi-
ple. However, in practice it is quite difficult to accurately 
measure a pre-war death rate, let alone a trend. Hence, 
adopting the HSR recommendation would be likely to add 
considerable random noise into excess death calculations as 
a price for improving their theoretical foundations.11
The implied counterfactual for the binary DiD is that the 
trend in the non-violent zone, pre-war to during-war, gives 
the trend the violent zone would have experienced without 
the war. This approach potentially improves on the standard 
excess deaths approach by allowing for a common, but pos-
sibly nonzero, national mortality rate trend without war 
rather than mechanically applying a pre-war baseline mor-
tality rate. Moreover, the binary DiD addresses the main 
HSR concern by baselining a trend, rather than just a fixed 
level. But the binary DiD has at least two important weak-
nesses. First, pre-war trends could be very different in the 
two zones, in which case a DiD regression might, spuri-
ously, attribute differing during-war trends to violence. The 
standard practice in the literature of checking for common 
earlier trends will often be infeasible in war mortality stud-
ies because there will not be a long enough run of data to do 
so.12 Second, this approach only picks up localized spillo-
vers from violence to non-violent death rates. A DiD regres-
sion would give insignificant results if, for example, 
violence causes non-violent mortality rates to increase 
equally in both violent and non-violent zones.
Conclusions
We use the same data as the original authors did and refute 
the claim (Hagopian et al., 2013) that the Iraq war caused 
half a million excess deaths. Our analysis is superior to the 
original work because we account for i) most importantly, 
the distinction between violent and non-violent deaths; ii) 
the stratified sampling design; iii) uncertainty over deaths 
not confirmed by death certificates; and iv) the baseless 
increase from 406,000 up to 500,000.
The war in Iraq has certainly led to several hundred thou-
sand violent deaths and perhaps some non-violent excess 
deaths as well.13 However, methodologically sound estimates 
based on the UCIMS data struggle to rule out even negative 
excess death estimates for violent plus non-violent deaths 
combined. This failure probably reflects data and methodo-
logical weaknesses as much as the underlying reality.
Our paper offers methodological lessons that extend 
beyond the Iraq application. First, excess death calculations 
should always include estimates for non-violent deaths 
alone. Second, researchers should supplement excess death 
estimates with DiD ones. These ideas have been helpful in 
our Iraq analysis and should bear further fruit in the future.
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Notes
 1. Human Security Report Project (2011) debunked the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) estimate mainly for 
non-random sampling in its early rounds, for comparing dur-
ing-war mortality rates with an inappropriately high baseline 
mortality rate, and for mortality rate estimates that are incom-
patible with other DRC mortality evidence. Guha-Sapir (2010) 
criticized the Hagan and Palloni (2006) estimate for excessive 
reliance on mortality rates in refugee camps, which might 
diverge substantially from in-country mortality rates
 2. There is a large potential pay off to exploiting geographical 
variation in violence levels in conflicts beyond the Iraq war 
since war intensity tends to vary greatly over space (Ward 
and Gleditsch, 2002; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008).
 3. We expand on point iii in the subsection ‘From 400,000 to 
500,000’.
 4. See the original paper for further methodological details.
 5. Typically, both the real and baseline death rates are estimated 
rather than calculated precisely, so we end up with an esti-
mated excess death rate and an estimated number of excess 
deaths.
 6. There can be good reasons for stratification. For example, 
stratification can increase estimation precision in strata with 
high variation by taking relatively large samples in these 
strata, but it must be built into one’s estimation scheme.
 7. Nothing is recorded in the death certificate field for three 
deaths
 8. The lead author of the study even characterized 500,000 as 
‘likely a low estimate’ (KPLU, 2013; National Geographic 
News, 2013).
 9. To avoid confusion note that deaths are measured twice in 
each household, once for the pre-war and once for the dur-
ing-war period whereas each household is either in the vio-
lent zone or in the non-violent zone during both periods.
10. We use Poisson, Quasi-Poisson and Negative Binomial mod-
els to handle the count data and to account for possible over-
dispersion (Gelman and Hill, 2007).
11. Indeed, the HSR suggestion is unworkable with the UCIMS 
data for the Iraq war because the pre-war measured down-
ward trend is so steep in this dataset that the baseline quickly 
plunges unrealistically all the way down to zero early in the 
during-war period (see appendix for Figure A2).
12. This is the case with the Hagopian et al. (2013) study.
13. See, for instance, the Iraq Body Count project for more infor-
mation (https://www.iraqbodycount.org/).
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